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Introduction.
There is a well-developed tradition in the literatures of business and economics that
sees organizations as information-processing systems. It is perhaps quite natural,
then, that students of organization have long been fascinated with cybernetics and
the mathematical theory of information as a way to understand organizational
learning and structure. Apart from providing concrete content to the notion of
“information,” this theory also has the benefit of linking closely the ideas of
information content and of “organization” itself through the formalism of what
statistical thermodynamics calls entropy. However, the severe limitations of this
approach for matters economic are equally well understood: the measure of
information per se does not take into account the economic value of information
(Langlois 1983; Arrow 1974). Furthermore, cybernetic models of organizations
also typically take as fixed the information structure of a system. To the extent that
organizations learn, they do so the way economic actors do in the neoclassical
economics of information, that is, by receiving signals that update probability
distributions over known and given contingencies. There is little in the literature
about how organizations create categories of understanding in the first place, about
how information builds a knowledge structure.
Nonetheless, there may well remain a place for the cybernetic theory of
information within economics. Information theory is in many ways about structure
and complexity. And present-day economics is concerning itself increasingly with
such questions, in such areas as evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter 1982)
and the economics of institutions (Langlois 1986). This essay attempts to revisit
the cybernetic theory of information and some related ideas in order to develop a
notion of self-organization relevant to understanding organizational learning.
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Knowledge and Structure.
It is conventional to see the distinction between knowledge and information as a
distinction between a stock and a flow. This is certainly unobjectionable, and
maybe even useful, as long as we don't take the metaphor too seriously.
Knowledge is not a stock in the same sense that oil in a tank is a stock, something
modified in a purely quantitatively way by the inflow or outflow of info-fluid1
(Langlois 1983, pp. 586-7). Knowledge is about structure. As the late Kenneth
Boulding put it,
we cannot regard knowledge as simply the accumulation of
information in a stockpile, even though all messages that are
received by the brain may leave some sort of deposit there.
Knowledge must itself be regarded as a structure, a very complex
and frequently quite loose pattern, ... with its parts connected in
various ways by ties of varying degrees of strength. Messages are
continually shot into this structure; some of them pass right through
its interstices ... without effecting any perceptible change in it.
Sometimes messages “stick” to the structure and become part of it.
... Occasionally, however, a message which is inconsistent with the
basic pattern of the mental structure, but which is of a nature that it
cannot be disbelieved hits the structure, which is then forced to
undergo a complete reorganization. (Boulding 1955, pp. 103-104,
quoted in Machlup 1983, p. 643n).
In order for a message to “stick” to the structure — or, more importantly, for the
message to modify the structure in a useful way — that message must be
meaningful to the receiving system.

The message must somehow “fit.”

As

Kenneth Arrow (1974, chapter 2) notes, individuals and organizations have
information structures that are in the nature of message decoders. To understand
messages in Chinese, for example, one needs to have learned Chinese. Choosing
an information structure, like learning a language, thus involves an investment that
is typically costly in both money and time. To put it another way, information
structures develop or evolve slowly and cannot be recreated or “reengineered”
quickly or costlessly.

1.

On this point cf. also Hayek (1952, p. 105) on the “storage” theory of memory.
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The association of knowledge with structure is intuitively appealing, if still
rather vague. What makes a structure “knowledge”? At some level, a structure
constitutes knowledge if that structure is ordered in a way that produces results.2
Think of genetics. We can say that DNA is a knowledge structure because it is an
orderly arrangement that “knows how” to do something, namely how to generate
an organism.

That organism in turn is also an ordered structure that does

something, namely survive the evolutionary process. Thus knowledge is a pudding
whose proof is in the eating, even if modern philosophers of science don't agree
about how much the eating proves.
Donald MacKay thinks of a system's structure as defining “conditional
states of readiness” on which a signal operates. It is the overall configuration that
determines the meaning — and the meaningfulness — of a message. “It isn't until
we consider the range of other states of readiness, that might have been considered
but weren't, that the notion of meaning comes into its own. A change in meaning
implies a different selection from the range of states of readiness. A meaningless
message is one that makes no selection from the range. An ambiguous message is
one that could make more than one selection” (MacKay, 1969, p. 24, emphasis
original). MacKay offers the metaphor of a railroad switching yard in which the
configuration of tracks and switches stands ready to direct the trains passing
through it. By sending the right electronic signal (or, in older yards, by inserting
the correct key in a switch-box) one can rearrange the configuration of tracks. The
meaningfulness of a message thus depends on its form — on the shape of the key.

2.

Indeed, cybernetic information theory has tended to think of knowledge and information in
behaviorist terms. A stimulus is information to the extent that it elicits some response from
the structure it stimulates. As MacKay (1969) notes, however, such a Skinnerian conception
is as naive in this as it is in other matters. A signal may change a knowledge structure in a
way that is meaningful — i.e., it may modify the future or potential behavior of the system —
without that change resulting in any directly observable response. In fact, as Machlup points
out, “[a]ny kind of experience — accidental impressions, observations, and even ‘inner
experience’ not induced by stimuli received from the environment — may initiate cognitive
processes leading to changes in a person's knowledge. Thus, new knowledge can be acquired
without new information being received” (Machlup 1983, p. 644, emphasis original).
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And that meaning consists in the change the message effects in the arrangement of
the yard, the selection it makes from the set of all possible configurations.
But where does the structure of knowledge — the railroad switching yard —
come from? How does it form, and how is it modified by experience? In a work
only now being appreciated by cognitive psychologists (Weimer 1982; Edelman
1987), F. A. Hayek (1952) put forward a rich and sophisticated theory of mind as
structure. In this theory, “that which we call knowledge is primarily a system of
rules of action assisted and modified by rules indicating equivalences or differences
of various combinations of stimuli” (Hayek 1978, p. 41).
To survive, an organism must respond appropriately to the stimuli — the
information — provided by its environment.

Both phylogenetically and

ontogenetically, organisms, in Hayek's view, use the pattern of stimuli to which
they are subjected to create complex interpretive or classificatory systems that help
them take appropriate action in response to future stimuli. The neural system of the
brain (and, more generally, the nervous system as a whole) creates, with
experience, a semipermanent structure or “map” that guides action — not only in
response to new stimuli but also through processes of internal reclassification and
recombination that lead to innovation.
In short, learning — whether in the organism or in the organization — is a
matter of self-organization, that is, of the creation of structure. How is such selforganization possible? Can we begin to understand the process of self-organization
in a way that is relevant to understanding the cognitive processes of learning in the
brain or in the economy? In what follows, we pick up some neglected strands in
the cybernetic theory of information and use them to put forward a picture of, and
potentially a framework for analyzing, self-organization.

The theory of information, redundancy, and learning.
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The theory of information defines the quantity of information contained in a
message by Shannon’s well-known formula. Let x ∈ {xi} be some elementary
event, e.g., the occurrence of one particular symbol out of a set of collectively
exhaustive and mutually exclusive possible symbols.

Then the quantity of

information — or, alternatively, the entropy3 — of the system x is
H ( x) = − ∑ p(i ) og2 p(i ),
i

where p(i) is the probability that the symbol xi will occur. It is well known that the
entropy of a system is greatest when all its microstates are independent and
equiprobable.

Saviotti (1991, p. 180) provides a relevant example.

In an

organization in which all members have the same skills, functions, and power (that
is, an organization with no division of labor), one could randomly reassign workers
to tasks without degrading performance. We could say that the microstates of such
an organization are equiprobable.

Once labor is divided and skill differences

emerge, however, such a random rearrangement would degrade performance. All
microstates are not equiprobable. The organization with a division of labor is thus
a lower-entropy or more “ordered” system than the organization with undivided
labor and undifferentiated skills.
Consider now a system that can transmit two different kinds of messages, a
∈ {xi} and b ∈ {xj}. These might, for example, be two different characteristics of a
product, such as its technical characteristics and it demand characteristics (Saviotti
1991, p. 199). Each of the two characteristics can take on a range of possible
states. We can calculate the information content of a message about characteristic
b conditional on having received a message about characteristic a as:
H (b| a) = − ∑ p(i ) p( j|i ) og2 p( j|i ),
i, j

3

Entropy is, however, in different units, as the thermodynamics variant of this formula is
multiplied by Boltzmann’s constant.
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where p(i) and p(j) are the probabilities that a = xi and b = xj, and the p(j|i) are the
conditional probabilities that b = xj given a = xi. (If we change the interpretation so
that p(j|i) is the probability that the system is in state j at time t+1 given that it was
in state i at time t, then this formula is identical to that of a first-order Markov
chain.) In effect, H(b|a) measures the residual uncertainty about characteristic b
left after having already received information about a. The expression H(b|a) is
usually referred to as equivocation or ambiguity. For example, if information about
one of the product’s characteristics given the other reduces the overall uncertainty
about the product, then technical characteristics and service characteristics are not
fully independent as far as the information emitted by the product is concerned. At
the same time, however, if knowledge of one characteristic does not convey
complete information about the other, there is ambiguity in this sense.
The problem of organization becomes more interesting when we consider
the perturbations to the system from the outside environment. In communications
theory, such perturbations always enter as the phenomenon of noise.

If we

consider a and b in this context to be signals input into and output from a
communications channel, respectively, then H(a) ≠ H(b) implies the presence of
noise. In communications theory, then, ambiguity arising from noise is always
destructive, in the sense that the quantity of information transmitted along the
channel is diminished. To correct for this loss of information, one can make the
message redundant, that is, one can repeat certain symbols or otherwise use extra
symbols for error-checking (e.g., by including the sum of a series of digits as a
supplemental digit). This will have the effect of reducing the average information
content of the message transmitted, since with redundancy some symbols have only
an error-checking function and not a message-conveying function, which means
that it takes more symbols to convey the same message. Another way to reduce the
deleterious effects of noise is to make the system more reliable by increasing the
number of parallel channels through which the same signal is transmitted (von
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Neumann 1956). That is, one can introduce redundancy into the system itself
rather than into the message transmitted.
The redundancy of a system is defined as
R = 1−

HR
,
Hmax

(1)

where Hmax is the quantity of information of the message with no redundancy (with
no extra symbols or redundant channels) and HR is the quantity of information with
redundancy.

Moreover, since redundancy essentially means that the symbols

transmitted are not independent of one another (that is, the point of redundant
information is to convey information about the original message), we can write the
information content of the message with redundancy in a way analogous to our
equation for ambiguity. If we assume the relationship among messages to be that
of a first-order Markov chain, we have

H R = − ∑ p(i ) p( j|i ) og 2 p( j|i ),
i, j

and

H max = − ∑ p(i ) og2 p(i ).
i

Atlan (1972) uses the ideas of ambiguity and redundancy to generate a
theory of the development and decay of complexity, which he views as a theory of
self-organization. In this theory, the presence of noise plays a role that is not solely
destructive but can in fact be creative, in that, by increasing ambiguity, noise can
increase the information content of a system in a way that is equivalent to
increasing variety and complexity. This approach rests on a crucial distinction,
which we hinted at above, between internal communication among the
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substructures of the system and external communication with an observer. Instead
of two different product characteristics, consider now two subsystems of a larger
system — substructures of an organization, for example — each composed of
elements y.

See Figure 1.

The substructures communicate with one another

internally, and the system communicates with an outside observer. Noise from
outside the system impinges on both transmissions, the external signal x processed
through the system and the internal signal y1 transmitted from substructure 1 to
substructure 2.

Noise
Input

x

Observer

y1

Substructure
1

Substructure
2

Figure 1
If there were no noise, that is, if all signals were transmitted without
ambiguity, then the information content of the internal system would be H= H(y1) =
H(y2). In effect, the information in substructure 2 would be a perfect replica of the
information in substructure 1. In such a case, Atlan would say that the two
substructures exert complete constraints on one another.

If, by contrast,

H = H (y1) + H (y2), the two substructures would be completely independent, and
information about substructure 2 would convey no information about, and would
therefore not constrain, substructure 1.
If we think in terms of the linear system of figure 1, however, these two
extremes are similar, in that they reflect structures that do not have as high an
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information content as possible and thus, to Atlan, are not as highly complex as
possible. (We return below to the interpretation of organization as complexity.)
Atlan (1972, p. 258, translation ours) puts it this way. “The important point is that
these two limiting cases, total absence of constraint and total constraint between the
substructures, both correspond to the absence of organization in the system: in the
first case, all we have is a juxtaposition of completely independent structures one
on the other; and, in the second, all we have is the same structure replicated N
times.” Consider the books in a library. All books in actual libraries contain
references to one another (footnotes, allusions, etc.): these connections are
constraints in Atlan’s sense. If all books were completely independent, in the sense
that no book in the library ever referred to any other in any way, we would
consider the society that produced the library not to have had a culture, as that term
is normally understood, and we would consider the library to be uncomplex, or at
any rate unorganized, in an important sense. At the same time, however, if, at the
other extreme, all books were perfect replicas of one another, we would also call
the library a non-complex structure. The implication: organizational complexity
requires ambiguity.
In communications theory, as we saw, ambiguity can reflect only a
deterioration in the quality of the signal. And, in Figure 1, this is also the case in
the transmission of the external signal x through the system. To the extent that y1
does not perfectly replicate x, information has been lost. But within the system,
ambiguity can mean an increase in information content. For if substructure 2 is
somewhat independent of substructure 1, that is, it is not an exact copy, then it
must contain some information not contained in substructure 1. Atlan calls the first
kind of ambiguity, that involving signal loss, destructive ambiguity; and he calls the
second kind, that arising from the increased independence of the second
substructure, autonomy ambiguity. Formally, the information content of the system
is
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H = H ( y1 ) + H ( y2 | y1 ) − H ( y1 | x).
The term H(y2|y1) reflects autonomy ambiguity, and the term H(y1|x) reflects the
destructive ambiguity of imperfect replication of information in communication
with the outside world.
A return to the library might help clarify. Imagine that the library is in a
monastery, perhaps of the kind depicted by Eco (1983). This monastery takes in
various newly discovered ancient texts (x), reads them (y1), copies them (y2), and
then distributes them to other libraries. To the extent that the monks make mistakes
in reading the texts (because of “noise”), then they will copy them imperfectly, and
there will be destructive ambiguity — information loss. If monks subsequently
read and copy imperfect copies, which are in turn read and copied subject to noise,
ad infinitum, we would expect the signal (the books sent to other libraries) to
deteriorate progressively over time.

(This is, of course, the Markov-chain

interpretation of the process.) But suppose that “noise” also effects the connection
between reading and copying the manuscript; that is, because the monk reads the
manuscript imperfectly, he purposely makes an imperfect copy — an interpretation
or gloss rather than (or in addition to) a literal copy. Such a process would also
introduce ambiguity, since y2 would come to diverge from y1. But such ambiguity
would add to the information in the system, since the monk would bring to the
interpretation knowledge not contained in the original text. Indeed, more noise
might in this context mean more information content, to the extent that more
difficulty in reading the original forces the monk to apply greater originality in the
commentary. The information the monk adds could, in fact, more than compensate
for the signal loss, and would constitute what Atlan views as self-organization. By
generalizing the two-substructure case to the case of many interconnected
substructures — many scholars reading and commenting on many texts — we can
envisage what von Neumann (1966) called an “extremely highly complicated

10

system.” In the language of Ashby (1956), increasing autonomy ambiguity can
mean an increase in variety.
In Atlan’s formulation, this notion of ambiguity autonomy has implications
for the life-cycle of organizations, both biological and social.

Recall that

redundancy is the key to a system’s success in overcoming noise.

And the

information content of the system, again, is H = Hmax(1-R). If we think in terms of
the system moving through time, and of the cumulative effect of noise on the
system, we can differentiate this equation with respect to time, yielding:
dH
dH
 − dR 
= H max 
 + (1 − R) max .
 dt 
dt
dt
Since both redundancy and Hmax ought to decrease over time under the cumulative
effects of noise, the first term on the right-hand side is positive and the second
negative. The first term reflects the effects of autonomy ambiguity: an increase in
information content as, in effect, redundancy is transformed into complexity by the
effects of noise on the internal communications within the system. The second
term reflects the destructive effect of noise on communication with the outside
world. Integrating the differential equation yields a time path of H, which, can, of
course, take many shapes, depending on the parameters and functional forms one
assumes.
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H=Hmax(1-R)

H0 = Hmax0 (1− R0)

t

tm

Figure 2
One possible pattern, however, would be one (as suggested in Figure 2) in
which there is self-organization. That is, H may increase until some critical time tm
before decreasing. The increasing phase of H(t) reflects the effects of increasing
autonomy ambiguity, which for a period overcompensates for the destructive
effects of noise. During this self-organizing phase, which Atlan likens to a period
of non-directed learning, complexity comes through a reduction in the system’s
redundancy.

In effect, redundancy is transformed into complexity.

After tm,

however, the system, with increasingly less redundancy at its disposal, succumbs to
the destructive effects of noise as Hmax progressively declines.
From the point of view of economic organization, however, this model may
not be wholly appropriate. For one thing, in what sense does information content
(H) measure complexity?

Is such complexity what we want to mean by

organization? As we suggested early on, high entropy implies maximum disorder
in a system.

Saviotti (1991, p. 183) provides another library example.
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The

information content of the words arranged in the books in a library is lower than
what the information content of the library would be if we cut up all the letters in
the books and dumped them in a pile on the floor. The pile of letters is the Hmax of
the library, which occurs when all the letters are equiprobable. The H of the actual
library is less than Hmax because, in effect, there is redundancy: sequences of letters
are repeated in ordered ways. As Saviotti suggests, the stored information of the
actual library is greater than its potential information (Hmax). Clearly, the actual
library is more ordered, more organized, and perhaps even more complex than the
Hmax library.
Indeed, von Foerster (1960, p. 37) has suggested that the appropriate
measure of organization — he uses the term “order” — is the redundancy measure
R. This has the nice property that when H = Hmax, that is, when the system’s
information content is at its maximum, R = 0, implying complete disorder. When,
on the other hand, the elements of the system are arranged so that information
about any one element conveys complete information about all others, then R = 1,
and the system is completely ordered or constrained.
One result of this definition is that von Foerster’s conception of selforganization is rather the opposite of Atlan’s For von Foerster, self-organization
occurs when R increases, not when R is converted into increasing H. Thus, a
dR
system is self-organizing (is becoming more orderly) when
> 0. Differentiating
dt
the expression for R (equation 1), we have
H max (dH
dt ) − H
dR
=−
2
dt
H max

( ).
dH max
dt

So long as we do not start out with a system of zero maximum entropy, the
denominator is always positive, and the condition for self-organization becomes:
H

dH max
dH
> H max
.
dt
dt
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(2)

If we consider the important case in which Hmax is a (positive) constant — as
in the case of the pile of letters on the library floor — then the condition for selforganization reduces to
dH
< 0.
dt
Increasing order means lower entropy, which is not, of course, surprising. Notice
again that this is the opposite of Altan’s model of self-organization: here
complexity (or information content, at any rate) is turned into redundancy instead
of the other way around. In order for information content to decrease, holding Hmax
constant, there must be a change in the conditional probabilities in the direction of
lower ambiguity. There must be a monk in the library rearranging the letters in the
pile (into books!) so that the probability of seeing the letter u conditional on having
just seen the letter q is no longer the same as, say, the probability of seeing an x
conditional on having just seen a q. In von Foerster’s terms, the monk is an
internal demon.
Suppose that, instead of holding Hmax constant, we hold H constant. In that
case, the condition for self-organization becomes:
dH max
> 0.
dt
That, is the maximum entropy of the system has to increase — without changing
the observed entropy. If maximum entropy is governed by the possible letters in
our pile, then this condition means that we would have to add new characters to the
alphabet, but in such a way that the relations among the letters, and the resulting
conditional probabilities, do not change. A more relevant and sensible image,
however, would be to return to the monastery library and to think in terms of new
ideas entering by way of recently unearthed Greek classics. The library would be
self-organizing — would be becoming more orderly — if, as the new ideas entered,
they could be reconciled with the existing body of ideas in a way that kept H
constant. In von Foerster’s terms, there must be an external demon (this time more
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closely akin to Maxwell’s famous spirit) who filters and arranges new elements of
the system so as to prevent entropy from increasing.

This sort of process is

probably not far from what actually went on in monastery libraries — or, indeed,
from what frequently goes on in organizations in general. (We will return to this
theme below.)
It is possible, of course, for H and Hmax to vary simultaneously. To see what
this would mean, we can reinterpret equation (2) in terms of the behavior of the
internal and external demons. The total differential of H is

dH =

∂H
∂H
dHmax +
dt
∂ Hmax
∂t

and
dH
∂ H dHmax
∂H
=
+
.
dt
∂ Hmax dt
∂t
The first term on the right-hand side represents the work of the external demon,
who controls both the rate of increase of maximum entropy and the way in which
changes in maximum entropy affect system entropy (H). Alternatively, we can
think of

dHmax
as reflecting the insertion of variety from outside the system. (In
dt

our monastic library example, this would be the flow of rediscovered classical
∂H
ideas.) In that case,
represents the effect of the external demon as
∂ Hmax
gatekeeper. If this partial is 1, then all the injected variety is turned into entropy,
and the external demon has had no effect; if the partial is 0, then the demon is a
∂H
perfect gatekeeper, and variety enters the system without increasing H.
∂t
represents the work of the internal demon, the organizer who arranges the elements
dH
already in the system. Plugging
into equation (2) gives:
dt

 dHmax
∂H
∂H
− H
< − Hmax
. (3)
 Hmax
∂ Hmax
∂t

 dt
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Notice that, when Hmax is large, learning is relatively easy, in the sense that the
efforts of the internal demon in keeping the right-hand side greater than the lefthand side (and thereby keeping the time derivative of R positive) are multiplied by
a large number. As the internal demon works to lower H, however, the bracketed
term on the left-hand side will grow larger. This means that the internal demon will
∂H
have to work harder (make
more negative), or, more typically, the rate of
∂t
growth of R will slow as R increases. Of course, as Hmax increases, the efforts of
the external demon will be multiplied by a larger number, and, in general, the
external demon could help the internal demon maintain the rate of growth of R for
∂H
a while by decreasing
. Eventually, however, unless Hmax increases fast
∂ Hmax
enough, the rate of growth of R will slow.

Self-organization: a schema.
Where does this leave us in the theory of self-organization? We suggested that
Atlan’s notion of self-organization is unsatisfactory in that it equates selforganization with an increase in information content. By contrast, von Foerster’s
choice of redundancy as a measure of orderliness has some appeal. Nonetheless, in
the end redundancy also provides an inadequate account of self-organization. The
reason is that redundancy is a relative measure or order. R approaches 1 when H is
small relative to Hmax. This means, however, that this measure would count as
equally organized a system with only two possible states and a system with a
million possible states, so long as their observed entropies were the same fraction
of their maximum entropies. Clearly, however, our intuitive notion of “highly
organized” encompasses both Atlan’s notion of complexity as high H — or, more
appropriately, high Hmax — and von Foerster’s notion of orderliness as redundancy.
In other words, self-organization means both increased complexity (or variety) and
increased redundancy. Figure 3 summarizes this idea.
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Complex
Complex but
but
disorganized
disorganized

Complex and
Complex
and orderly
orderly

Hmax

Simple and
Simple
and orderly
orderly

Simple and
Simple
and
disorganized
disorganized

Redundancy
Redundancy

Figure 3
Thus both Altan and von Foerster are necessary for a complete account of
self-organization.

Clearly, self-organization implies a movement from the

southwest to the northeast corner of Figure 3. But that movement needn’t be along
a straight line. We can imagine an organization (for example, a firm or network of
firms) that first moves directly north up the diagram and then gradually moves east.
Such an organization thus has an early phase of non-directed learning — a phase of
what, following Piaget, Atlan (1972, p. 267) calls “assimilation.” In this phase,
growth in Hmax may outstrip the powers of both the internal and the external
demons to hold the line on H, and R may actually increase (the organization may
veer temporarily to the west).

Self-organization also requires, however, that

eventually the redundancy of the system increase as potential is transformed into
stored information.
Without wanting to make to much of the point, we should notice that such a
pattern is congruent with life-cycle models of innovation and product development
(Utterback 1979). In those models, the early stages of the life of a new product are
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marked by fluidity, rapid change in characteristics, and a diversity of approaches.
Eventually, however, a dominant design or paradigm emerges. At that point,
product innovation gives way to process innovation, and learning — often rapid
learning, as measured by declines in product price — takes place within a relatively
fixed structure.
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